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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






TROY REESE, Appellant 
 
v. 
WARDEN PHILADELPHIA FDC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-18-cv-00902) 
District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 
I.O.P. 10.6 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and FUENTES, 
Circuit Judges 
 









FUENTES. Circuit Judge.  
Pro se appellant Troy Reese appeals the District 
Court’s order dismissing his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  
Reese, who is awaiting criminal trial in federal court, raised 
claims challenging the evidence supporting the charges 
against him, the conduct of the law-enforcement officers who 
arrested and interrogated him, and the District Court’s refusal 
to release him pending trial.  As we have previously stated, a 
detainee’s challenge to the conduct of law enforcement 
officers in connection with his arrest or the validity of the 
charges against him must be addressed in an appropriate 
pretrial motion.  See Government of Virgin Islands v. 
Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135, 1136 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam).  
We write to address a novel question in our Court: may a 
federal detainee challenge his pretrial detention via a § 2241 
habeas petition?  We join the two other Circuits to have 
addressed this issue and conclude that a federal detainee’s 
request for release pending trial can only be considered under 
the Bail Reform Act and not under a § 2241 petition for 
habeas relief.  See Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 
1017-19 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Pipito, 
861 F.2d 1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 
 The events leading to this appeal began in December 
2017, when Reese was charged in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania with one count of using a facility and means of 
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interstate or foreign commerce to attempt to induce, entice, or 
coerce a minor into engaging in sexual activity in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).  See E.D. Pa. Cr. A. No. 17-cr-0631.  
Reese was arrested, and the Government filed a motion for 
pretrial detention.  The Government argued that there was 
probable cause to believe that Reese had committed the 
charged offense, which created a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of detention, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E), and that 
other factors, including Reese’s criminal record and the 
length of the sentence he faced, further militated in favor of 
detention.  A Magistrate Judge granted the Government’s 
motion. 
 
 In February 2018, Reese filed the § 2241 petition at 
issue in this appeal.  In this petition, he claimed that the 
criminal charge was baseless, that the police had violated his 
constitutional rights in the course of arresting and 
interrogating him, and that he was entitled to be released 
pending trial.  This filing was docketed separately from the 
criminal action, see E.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 18-cv-00902, but 
assigned to the same District Judge.   
 
 In March 2018, Reese, through counsel, filed a motion 
for pretrial release in the criminal case.  The District Court 
held a hearing and denied the motion, concluding that the 
evidence against Reese was “overwhelming,” that Reese had 
numerous prior criminal convictions, that Reese had 
previously violated conditions of bail, and that Reese lacked 
ties to the community.  Reese appealed that order.  That 
appeal is pending at C.A. No. 18-1748.1   
                                              
1 Counsel was appointed for Reese in that appeal, and the 
appeal has been stayed pending a final competency 
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After denying Reese’s request for release in the 
criminal action, the District Court dismissed the § 2241 
petition, and Reese instituted the appeal now before the 
Court. 
 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s legal conclusions.  See Cradle v. United 
States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam).  Because Reese is a federal prisoner appealing the 
dismissal of a § 2241 petition, he need not obtain a certificate 
of appealability to proceed.  See United States v. Cepero, 224 
F.3d 256, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on 
other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012). 
 
 Section 2241 confers on district courts the authority to 
entertain applications for a writ of habeas corpus filed by 
prisoners claiming to be “in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  § 
2241(c)(3).  Nevertheless, “a habeas court is ‘not bound in 
every case’ to issue the writ.”  Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 
693 (2008) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 
(1886)).  Thus, even in cases where the habeas court has the 
authority to grant relief, it must consider “whether this be a 
case in which that power ought to be exercised.”  Id. 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 
Pet.) 193, 201 (1830)); see also Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 
525, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing prudential concerns 
that may counsel against using habeas power). 
                                                                                                     
determination in the District Court.  We express no opinion as 
to the merits of that appeal. 
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 Courts have consistently refused to exercise their 
habeas authority in cases where federal prisoners have sought 
relief before standing trial.  Instead, Courts have long stressed 
that defendants should pursue the remedies available within 
the criminal action.  See, e.g., Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 
391 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular 
judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus 
should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Riggins v. 
United States, 199 U.S. 547, 551 (1905) (vacating order 
granting habeas relief to federal pretrial detainees because 
there was “nothing in this record to disclose that there were 
any special circumstances which justified a departure from 
the regular course of judicial procedure” of pretrial motions 
and, if necessary, appeal); see also Medina v. Choate, 875 
F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 2017) (adopting “the general rule 
that § 2241 is not a proper avenue of relief for federal 
prisoners awaiting federal trial”).2  
                                              
2 The Supreme Court has suggested that pretrial habeas relief 
might be available to a federal defendant in “exceptional 
circumstances.”  See Jones, 245 U.S. at 391; Johnson v. Hoy, 
227 U.S. 245, 247 (1913); see also Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 
702 F.2d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1983).  Neither the Supreme Court 
nor this Court has delineated the circumstances that might 
qualify as “exceptional” in this context.  See generally 
Medina, 875 F.3d at 1029 (“If a federal prisoner is ever 
entitled to relief under § 2241 based on something that 
happened before trial, the circumstances are so rare that they 
have apparently not yet arisen.”).  We have ruled that a state 
prisoner may pursue a pretrial § 2241 petition without 
exhausting state remedies in “extraordinary circumstances,” 
which might exist when there is a showing of “delay, 
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Funneling requests for pretrial relief through the 
criminal action encourages an orderly, efficient resolution of 
the issues, maintains respect for the appellate process, and 
prevents duplication of judicial work and judge-shopping.  
See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.10 
(1979) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus should not 
do service for an appeal,” and that “[t]his rule must be strictly 
observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be maintained” 
(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 
269, 274 (1942)); see also Medina, 875 F.3d at 1028–29 
(identifying similar interests). 
 
 We relied on this rationale in Government of Virgin 
Islands v. Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1970) (per 
curiam), to affirm the District Court’s denial of pretrial 
habeas petitions filed by federal defendants.  We rejected the 
defendants’ challenges to their arrest and interrogation on the 
ground that a pretrial motion in the criminal case, “rather than 
their petition for writs of habeas corpus, provides the 
appropriate avenue of relief before trial.”  Id. at 1136.  We 
similarly held that the defendants’ claim that they had been 
denied a speedy trial should be resolved “on an appropriate 
pretrial motion.”  Id.  Accordingly, insofar as Reese sought to 
challenge the charges against him or the conduct of law-
                                                                                                     
harassment, bad faith or other intentional activity” on the part 
of the state.  Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 447 n.12 (3d 
Cir. 1975).  We need not delimit the precise bounds of any 
exception here because Reese’s claims—run-of-the-mill 
challenges to his indictment, arrest, interrogation, and denial 
of pretrial release—are not “exceptional” under any plausible 
definition of that term. 
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enforcement officers during arrest or interrogation, he was 
required to do so through pretrial motions in his criminal 
case, not via a pretrial § 2241 petition.  See id. 
 
 Section 2241 is likewise not the proper vehicle for 
Reese to challenge his detention pending trial.  The Bail 
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150, provides a 
comprehensive scheme governing pretrial-release decisions.  
See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742–43 
(1987).  First, a judicial officer will order the defendant’s 
release or detention.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142.  If an initial 
detention order is issued by a magistrate judge, the defendant 
can file a motion asking the District Court to revoke or amend 
that order.  See id. § 3145(b).  And, if the District Court 
denies relief, the defendant can file an appeal, which “shall be 
determined promptly.”  Id. § 3145(c).   
 
For all the reasons discussed above with respect to 
Reese’s other claims, federal defendants who seek pretrial 
release should do so through the means authorized by the Bail 
Reform Act, not through a separate § 2241 action.  See 
Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1017-19 (5th Cir. 
1988) (per curiam); United States v. Pipito, 861 F.2d 1006, 
1009 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 
(1951) (“the District Court should withhold relief in this 
collateral habeas corpus action where an adequate remedy 
available in the criminal proceeding has not been 
exhausted”).3  The District Court therefore did not err in 
                                              
3 In Bolones, we sustained a challenge to a denial of bail in a 
habeas corpus proceeding, but we did not consider, and it 
appears that the parties did not raise, the pertinent question 
here about whether § 2241 is an appropriate vehicle to assert 
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refusing to entertain the request for pretrial release that Reese 
pressed in his § 2241 petition. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal 
presents “no substantial question,” and we will hence 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Reese’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied.  To the extent that any of Reese’s other 
filings in this Court request additional relief, they are denied. 
                                                                                                     
such a claim.  See Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1341 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“Questions which merely lurk in the record, 
neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, 
are not to be considered as having been so decided as to 
constitute precedents.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Webster 
v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). 
